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This paper is concerned with tax policies designed to obtain an improved
competitive allocation in the presence of consumption externalities. It is
known that the full optimum can, in general, be attained only through
the imposition of excise taxes at different levels for different individuals.
Since these may be ruled out (possibly because of implementation costs),
one is confined to consider second-best taxes. The common interpretation
of the Pigouvian principle has called for taxes on the externality-creating
commodities. With no relationships between the consumption of different
commodities the Pigouvian principle is obviously impeccable. But the
existence of substitutes or complements for an externality-causing com-
modity raises the possibility of indirect policies: treating the externality
through the markets for related goods. Obviously, if the direct policy is
not feasible, the indirect treatment may provide some partial remedy.
We show, however, that even when direct policies are available, the
overall optimum may involve only indirect policies. An example with such
a result is provided in the paper. We also list a number of cases in which
the traditional prescription is confirmed, and the overall optimum in-
volves only direct policies.
The economic analysis of situations involving externalities has focused
on two related issues. The first is the comparison between competitive
eqmlibri\im and Pareto-optimal allocations, while the second concerns
tax policies designed to obtain an improved competitive allocation.
The degree of improvement depends, of course, on the scope of the
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available fiscal instruments and on the form of the externalities. It is
known that the full optimum can, in general, be attained only through
the imposition of excise taxes at different levels for different individuals.
As we shall show below, a notable exception to this rule is the case of
consumption externalities which depend on the total consumption of
certain commodities by the economy provided that individuals disregard
the effect of their actions on the level of externalities. In this case, which
Meade (1952) appropriately termed "atmosphere" externalities, ordinary
commodity taxes are sufficient for achievement of the full optimum.
This type of externality is the analog of the perfectly competitive model,
because in the large-numbers case the individual would be correct in
neglecting the influence of his consumption on the level of the externality
in the aggregate. In more general cases, for example, with a small number
of consumers or with large numbers but asymmetries in individuals'
behavior or in externality generation, policies discriminating between
individuals are required for attaining a full Pareto optimum. Since
these may be ruled out (possibly because of implementation costs), one
is confined to consider second-best taxes. This is the case treated in this
paper.
The problem of the optimal tax policy is to determine the commodities
upon which taxes are imposed (or subsidies granted) and the optimum
levels of these taxes. The Pigouvian principle (Pigou 1932, pp. 192 ff.),
accepted by all writers (see, for example, Baumol [1972] and the refer-
ences therein), has been to impose a tax/subsidy on the generator of
the externality. In the case of nonreciprocal negative production ex-
ternalities (smoke affecting costs of neighboring laiindries), this is achieved
by imposition of effluent charges aimed at restricting output of the
externality-creating factor. In the case of reciprocal consumption ex-
ternalities, the common interpretation of the Pigouvian principle calls
for taxes on the externality-creating commodities. Again, Davis and
Whinston (1962), Plott (1966), Buchanan (1969), and others have shown
that according to this principle anomalous cases cannot be ruled out.
For example, with negative externalities an improvement may be realized
by granting a subsidy rather than imposing a tax.
This literature has completely neglected the question of the proper
variables to be taxed (or subsidized). With no relationships between the
consumption of different commodities the Pigouvian principle is obviously
impeccable. But the existence of substitutes or complements for an ex-
ternality-causing commodity raises the possibility of indirect policies:
treating the externality through the markets for related goods. Thus, if
cars create smog, one remedy may be to tax goods complementary with
car trips (such as recreation).
It seems plausible that indirect policies are in general inferior to direct
policies. In the international trade literature, for example, one findsREMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 799
Statements that in the presence of market distortions (which may be
viewed as a kind of extemahty) direct fiscal policy in these markets is
always superior to indirect policies (Johnson 1972).
On the basis of a more general model, we reach a different conclusion.
Obviously, if the direct policy is not feasible, the indirect treatment may
provide some partial remedy. We show, however, that even when direct
poKcies are available, the overall optimum may involve only indirect
policies. An example with such a result is provided below. Diamond (1973)
has a similar example where the direct policy fails, but he has not con-
sidered the possibility of indirect policies. We also list a number of cases
in which the traditional prescription is confirmed and the overall optimum
involves only direct pohcies.
The Model
We consider a model which has two consumers who purchase an ex-
ternality-causing good a and a related good ^, among other commodities.
To rule out income effects we assxime that utility is linear in income net
of expenditures on a and j5. The unit costs of a and P 3.rt p and q. Policies
considered in this paper are per unit taxes/subsidies on consumption of
a and j3, denoted t and z, respectively. Consumers face prices p -\- t
and q -\- z^or these goods, and maximize their utility functions given by
U = u{a,, i5i, a^) + Zi + Ti, (1)
V = v{ai2. p2. oc,) + Z^ + r,, (2)
where X^ = /; - {p + O^i - (? + ^)Pi> i = IJ 2, /^ are exogenous in-
comes of the two individuals, and T^ are lump-sum transfer payments,
representing a redistribution of tax revenues.
Note that in this formulation the individual's consumption choices
of a and ^ are independent of his money income and his lump-sum taxes.
The transfer payments are thought of as proportional redistributions
of the tax revenue. If 6 is the share of individual 1 in the taxes collected.
T, = eitioc, + a^) + z{p, + ^2)]. (3)
The first-order conditions for the individuals' maximization problems,
assuming that the others' actions are fixed, are
It is clear that competitive equilibria with ^ = z = 0 are generally8OO JOURNAL OF POLITIGAL EGONOMY
inefficient. The goals of this study are to evaluate the comparative
efficacy of t and z as policy tools and to investigate the seenningly intuitive
presumption that direct corrective taxation is a superior tool.
Negative Result
In this section we present an example showing that indirect taxation
may be a useful policy while direct measures are impotent. To do this we
demonstrate that /* = 0 is the optimal direct tax when z = 0 and
that^* ^ 0 is the optimal indirect tax when ^ = 0. A fortiori, the resulting
allocation, when indirect taxes are used, is superior.
Consider the case of a direct tax, and let
U = %{Q, t),
(6)
V = r{9 )
be the realized values of utility in an equilibrium in which t and Q are the
policy parameters. These functions can be depicted as in figure 1.
The dashed curves are iso-^loci in the (^, 6) space. A positive slope
indicates d^jdt < 0, since d^jdQ is always positive. Restricting ourselves
to the policy variables 9 and ^, a constrained Pareto optimum is charac-
terized as a maximum of ^ -h T^, with respect to these variables. Since
there are no income effects, we have (d^jdO) = —{di^jdQ).
This explains why all such constrained optima (0*, i*) are determined
by /* alone, since any d woiild satisfy the first-order conditions. The
first-order condition for an optimal i*, which is therefore the only opera-
tive condition, is given by
* ^*) rf-r(0* /*)
dt dt
In particular, the optimal t may be found by setting both sides of the
last equation to zero. However, since neither a nor ^ levels are affected
by changes in transfers, this equation continues to hold for all B. All
Pareto optima are associated with the same ^*, as depicted in figure 1.
Zero will be the optimal tax if
0 = ^^(^' Q) (8)
dt
and
0 =
for some 9.
Let 9^ and 62 be the solutions of (8) and (9). Then, ;* = 0 requiresREMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 801
Pore to
optimal t
9=\
FIG. 1
Differentiating the ^ and iT totally with respect to t using the budget
constraints obtained by substituting (3) and (4) into (1) and (2), and
making use of the first-order conditions (5), one can derive
a _ «
C7i
+ 0.
(10)
(11)
where doi-Jdt is the total derivative of consumption with respect to ?,
including the change induced through an altered level of the extemahty,
in equilibrium. In the case of an externality that is harmful to both indi-
viduals, it should be noted that B^ = B2 will be satisfied if (exactly) one
of the individuals increases his consumption of the externality-causing
good in response to increases in the tax—that is, ifda^ldt and d(X2ldt have
opposite signs.
One can regard the change in demand as being composed of two parts.
First, there is a direct effect of price, holding the externality fixed, which
amounts to a pure-own substitution effect (movement along a given
demand curve). Since there are no income effects, this must be negative.
Second, there is the effect of the altered level of the other individual's
consumption at constant prices, the sign of which depends on the cross-
derivative of utility with respect to these arguments. If a higher level
of the externality induces a greatly increased level of demand, this may
outweigh the first effect and produce a positive total derivative with
respect to L^ The example of this section has this property, as will be
seen below.
Differentiating the first-order conditions (5) with respect to the a's.
^ This is related to the perverse behavior of aggregate consumption of the extemahty
generating good between equilibria and Pareto optima, as discussed in Diamond and
Mirrlees (1973).8O2 JOURNAL OF POUTIGAL EGONOMY
's, and ty holding p and q fixed with z = 0, and solving for dccxjdt and
, we have
U22V + ^22
Ov - Ov
+ ^2
^ Ov- 0?
where
U — ^^2^23 ^13^22?
V = v,,v.. - v\.,
11 XX Ix'
Note that L/ and V are positive due to the second-order conditions.
The terms f7and Fare related to the effects of the externality on the two
goods in question.
We have, therefore, that B^ = ^2 ^f
+ Z^22^) + ^^3(^22^ + ^22^) = 0. (13)
Similarly, ^'(0, z) and i^'{9, z) are the utilities attained when only
indirect taxation is allowed, and 9\ and 02 ^^^ defined by
^ dm'{Q\, 0) ^ dr'{Q\, 0)
The optimal z will be different from zero whenever 9\ ^ ^2- Following
the analysis above,
(15)
+ ^1^
Condition (14) is therefore
^ ^ # 0. (16)
where all derivatives are evaluated at the consumption levels of the un-
t£Lxed equilibrium. Rewriting (13) and (16) we have
^ Z^^ 0 -"^v - i^i^ O (17)
"22 "3 "3"22
(18)
W12 "3 "3^12REMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 803
To show that (17) and (18) can be consistent, let U and V have the
forms
(19)
y = h{0C2, ai) +j{P2)-
Thus,
0 = 0,
V ^ Vi iVt-i. 11 ^ z
Hence, conditions (17) and (18) are
-0
"22
(20)
V^2 # 0, (21)
and
ty ^ 0. (22)
Since v-^, u^ and z^^ are all negative, we can show that these relations
may be satisfied when evaluated at points that would be chosen in a com-
petitive economy wdthout taxes. This is done by selecting a value for
M3 to satisfy (20), having fixed all of the other functions. Because of the
separable functional form of U, this can be done without disturbing either
of the relationships (21) or (22). In order to be sure not to violate the
nonpositivity of U3 in doing so, we require
.,,< — . (23)
"22
It is therefore necessary to show only that the fixnctions f and h can be
chosen so as to satisfy (23). Let us take
a I, + b, < l;a,,b, > 0; (24)
Xi) = a^^arS 1 > 02 > 0;c > 0. (25)
One can show that
If p > a^ and q > b^, then ^^3 becomes arbitrarily large and negative
as c becomes large. Further, the equilibrium values of a^ and p^ are
independent of c; hence ^/w22 ^^ fixed. Therefore we can choose c suffi-
ciently large and will obtain the desired example.
Two further remarks need to be made in this context. We have not
shown that the only solutions to the first-order conditions are of the formJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
i* =0,^* ^ 0. However, we have placed no restrictions on u3 = g
except at the point given by the choice of a 2 with zero tax rates on both
commodities. One can easily see that by choosing g'{cc2) appropriately
at other values, it can be arranged that (19) is not satisfied at any nonzero
t. Hence the local character of this example can be extended globally
to imply that no direct commodity taxation can improve the laissez-
faire equilibrium, although indirect methods are effective.
Second, one might want to know the sign of the tax (subsidy) in the
market for P which is superior to any direct taxation on a. Suppose the
externality is harmful so that M3, v^ < 0 and that a and P are complements
in the ordinary sense of a negative cross-elasticity of demand. Here we
would expect a positive tax level to be the optimal indirect action, tending
to reduce the level of the externality.
A positives will be optimal if, at ^ = 0, we have (5^'/^'^) ^ —{d'f'ldz)
where ^' and i^' are as described above.
This is equivalent to 9\ < 02- Or, following an analogous derivation
to equations (10) and (11), this is,
doi2 ^ da^ .^_.
-M3 —- < Vj, —^ . (27)
^ dz dz
Substituting (15) in the above we have
^ Ov - 09 ^ Ov - Ov ^ ^
Since ?7 = 0 in the above example, and OV > 0 by the second-order
conditions, we have
< 0 (29)
is the condition for z* to be positive.
Using (16), since t* = 0 in the example, this becomes
"22
(30)
Since v^2'^^ zero, this is surely violated in the example, and the optimal
indirect tax has the perverse sign—positive for substitutes, negative for
complements. However, more complex examples in which v^2 ^ ^ may
provide instances in which the sign of z* has the expected behavior and
indirect taxation is still superior. This remains as an open question.
Positive Results
Having seen that indirect corrective taxation is superior under certain
conditions, we now turn our attention to the classification of conditions
under which such aberrations are impossible. The general problem of theREMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 805
superiority of direct taxation will not be treated here. Our more modest
results concern instances in which a zero tax on the related commodity
is best, the optimum being to operate solely on the market of the ex-
ternality-causing good even though more general policies are available.
We will show that this is the case if individuals are identical, or if the
externality depends on the aggregate consumption of the good in question,
each individual neglecting his influence on this aggregate. Again, certain
remarks concerning nonconvexities must be made, but we will demonstrate
some instances in which our conclusions hold without qualification.
Let
u = u(e., .),
V = v{e, I, )
be the utility levels attained with taxes t and z and redistribution parameter
6. By the linearity of utility in income, W = U -\- Fis independent of 0.
Necessary conditions for an optimal pair of taxes (/*, z*) are
0 = = (:;3 + ^) —1 -h (M3 -h 0 ^ +
dt dt dt
0 = — = (^3 + 0 -7^ + ("3 + 0
dz dz
all derivatives being evaluated at the points chosen with taxes
One can solve these conditions for t and z at the optimum. This yields
[{dajdt)
Substituting (12) and (15) in (33), one finds that
Z* = 0, if 1^3 = U3 or V,2U22 =
Two special instances in which these conditions hold are when individual's p
preferences are identical, or when they are separable in p. In general,
however, the optimal policy will involve taxes/subsidies in indirect
markets. Even in the case of identical utilities the foregoing conclusion
depends on the fact that individuals will have identical consumptions in
equilibrium.
Fixing prices and taxes, we can think of each individual's choice of
a as it depends on the level of the externality he faces. This gives rise
to two identical reaction functions, the intersections of which are equi-
librium consumptions of a for this model. We wish to establish that this
equilibrium is unique and occurs at a symmetric point. That is, we want
to establish conditions for these reaction curves to be as in case (1) rather
than case (2), in figure 2.8o6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
(2)
0
FIG. 2
A condition for this uniqueness to hold is that the slope of the reaction
curve be between 0 and — 1 everywhere. This will hold if utility can be
written in the form
+ i = 1, 2. (35)
The interpretation of such a functional form is that the externality takes
the form of aggregate consumption and affects the effective consumption
of services a, but not p. In this context it is natural to assume that simul-
taneous equal increases in the consLunption of a by both individuals does
not increase the effective level for both of them. Such an upward variation
in a^ and a2 (^a^ = d(X2) changes/byy^ifai +72(^^1 + ^0^2)- Therefore
we require
/i + 2/2 > 0. (36)
The individual's first-order conditions are
= P + ^^
U2 = q + z.
(37)
Differentiating totally, the slope of the individual's reaction curve is
shown to be
(38)
By (36) this is shown to be between 0 and —1 as desired.
In the foregoing analysis we have assumed that the individual takes
into account the full impact of his actions on his utility. However,
particularly in the case of a large number of consiuners, it may be more
natural to assume that consumption has direct benefits and also contributes
to an externality-causing aggregate. The individual may be ignoring his
marginal contribution to this aggregate. This form of externality has
been termed "atmosphere" by Meade (1952), who found that directREMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 807
taxation on the components of this aggregate could lead to a Pareto
optimum. In the context of the above analysis
U = 4>{cc,, p^, ai + (^2) + ^1 + T^,
V = A( P ) ^ 7^
The assumption that individuals disregard their contribution to the ex-
ternality is reflected in the equilibrium conditions
= q + Z, xj/^ = q -\- Z.
One should be careful in comparing (40) with the rather similar-
looking conditions (5). The utility functions (1) and (12) are different
from (39) in their behavioral implications because there the individual's
own consumption of a affects his utility in a way that he takes account
of^ explicitly. In (39) and (40) he optimizes with respect to his choice of
a by setting the derivative of utility with respect to its first argument
equal to price but does not subtract the effect of a through the third
argument. If the same behavioral hypothesis in (39) were taken, we
would have had 0i + </>3 = »Ai + 1A3 = Z' + ^5 instead.
Letting W = U -\- F we find that
dW = (01 j3), t2pi t32 (/1 ^3)2
- (41)
Using the first-order condition (40),
dW = {t + (l>^ + ^z)doi, + (^ + (/>3 + ^3)doi2 + z{dp^ + dP2)- (42)
Thus /* = — (/>3 — i/^3, ^* = 0 solves the optimization problem even
though both direct and indirect tax policies are available.
Following Diamond (1973), a more general form of atmosphere-type
externalities is given by the utility functions
U =
V =
for some function y. As above, individuals are assumed not to perceive
their influence on the level of 7, so that first-order conditions for their
maximization problems are given by (40).
Differentiating W with respect to / and z, a necessary condition for the
optimal ^* to be zero is
fe^_^^^ = O. (44)
dt dt dz)
In the additive case y^ = y^, and (44) is always satisfied. This will8o8 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
also hold in the case of identical individuals in the absence of additivity
(see above).
It will also hold, even if individuals are not identical, provided their
relative changes in the consumption of the externality-causing coramodity
with respect to the two taxes are equal; that is
{dajdt) _
{da^jdz) {d(X2ldz)
More generally, if (44) holds at a point where
^* (03 + ^3)[{dccjdt)y, + {d
[{dajdt) +
and z* = 0, then this is an optimum. Notice that (44) and (45) imply
that ^* = 0 only when
{dajdz) +
which means that the sum of marginal externalities, weighted by quantity
response to direct price change {t) is equal to the sum of marginal ex-
ternalities weighted by quantity response to indirect price change {z). ^
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